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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4- 103(e) as an appeal from the final judgment of a District Court.
ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in two (2) separate cases which
were consolidated for all purposes in the trial court and then on appeal. "We
review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 'abuse
of discretion' standard, incorporating the 'clearly erroneous' standard for the trial
court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision.1" State v. LehL
2003 Utah App. 212, 73 P.3d 985 Plain error is a question of law reviewed for
correctness." State v. TarnawieckL 2000 Utah App. 186, 5 P.3d 1222; State v.
Smit 2004 Utah App. 222, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah App. 2004) The issue was
preserved for appeal by filing a notice of appeal after a written decision.
STATEMENT OF RULE/STATUTE AT ISSUE
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides how a person
must plea, what the Court must look at in a withdrawal of a plea, and therefore,
included is Rule 11. The provisions Defendant believes are applicable are1:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;

Rule 11 may be found in its entirety in the Addendum at A23-A25.
1
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(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open
court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of
defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that
the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record
2
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as a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply
with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a
guilty plea.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural Background
Defendant was charged with violating a stalking injunction on two (2)
separate occasions and, thus, in two (2) separate cases. There were four (4) counts
in one (1) case and two (2) counts in the other. All counts alleged violations of a
stalking injunction; all six (6) counts were Class A Misdemeanors. (Addendum
A19-A22) (Clerk's Record 1,157,159)
Defendant plead guilty to one (1) count in each case for a total of two (2)
counts and the other counts were dismissed under a plea agreement with the State.
(CR15 7,15 9) After entry of the pleas and on the day of sentencing, Defendant
moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Addendum A10-A11, CR 92) The Court
denied the motion to withdraw pleas and Defendant timely appealed. (Addendum
A1-A4, CR144, 161, 165) This court consolidated the cases for appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges and Pleas
Defendant was charged with four (4) separate violations of the staking
statutes as found in Utah Code §76-5-106.5 on May 3, 2009. A Temporary Civil
Stalking Injunction had been issued against Defendant by the Court on April 17,
2009, prohibiting Defendant from having any contact with Shere Susanna Holtz
and Chandler Alan Holtz. (Record 1, 157, 159, Addendum A15, A19 and A21)
3
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Defendant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea along with
both the State's and Defendant's Counsel on October 19, 2009. (Record 85,
Addendum A5) The judgment and sentence was signed August 10, 2010, but not
filed with the clerk of the court until August 19, 2010. (Record 157, 159,
Addendum A19, A21) The first Notice of Appeal was filed August 20, 2010, and
an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 30, 2010. (Record 161, 165)
History of the Case as Summarized by the Trial Court
The motion to withdraw the plea was heard before the Court on April 26,
2010, and continued for additional testimony to July 1, 2010. (T,4/26/10,Pl,Ll 1,
P32, L8) Prior to commencement of the hearing, the court outlined the history of
the case as follows:
1.

On July 20, 2009, the case was set for a jury trial. (T,4/26/10,Pl,L23)

2.

On September 14, 2009, at a final Pretrial, the court was advised that
the case would go to trial and not settle. (T,4/26/10,Pl,L24)

3.

On October 19, 2009, Defendant and counsel appeared before the
court and Defendant entered pleas under a plea agreement with the
State. (T,4/26/10,P2,L2)

4.

On November 23, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
pleas. (T,4/26/10,P2,L6)

5.

The next day, November 24, 2009, after filing the motion to withdraw
pleas, counsel for Defendant moved to withdraw as attorney for
Defendant on the basis that counsel might be a witness in the motion
4
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to withdraw pleas. (T,4/26/10,P2,L8)
Thereafter followed a number of continuances because Defendant had
difficulty finding new counsel. (T,4/26/10,P2,L10)
New/Replacement Counsel's Conflict of Interest
Just before the plea withdrawal hearing on April 26, 2010, new/replacement
counsel for Defendant moved to withdraw as attorney for Defendant based on
"some difficulties that had arisen between counsel" and Defendant. (T,4/26/10,
P2,L21) At the April 26, 2010, hearing Defendant was given the option of
proceeding as his own lawyer or to proceed with his counsel in the role as an
advisor. Faced with these choices, Defendant elected to proceed with counsel.
(T,4/26/10,P3,L5-25)
The basis of the difficulties between Defendant and his second attorney was
an employment relationship of his attorney with his former counsel whom
Defendant believed had committed malpractice. Defendant did not believe that his
replacement counsel would pursue his claims properly because he had, at one
time, been an employee of his former counsel. (T,4/26/10,P3,L17-P5,L4)
Replacement counsel expressed to the Court that the choice given to Defendant
was, in effect, no choice at all. (T,4/26/10,P3,L2) The Court did not see a
problem: (T,4/26/10,P5,L10)
Defendant: Well, I don't know that there's any -1 don't know that there's a
problem, I just -1 don't feel that Danny really wants to question Rhome the
way he, an attorney who doesn't have a relationship with Rhome would would proceed with it.
Court: Well, I suppose we'll just have to see at the hearing
5
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(T,4/26/10,P5,L13)
Trial Court's Decision on Conflict
The conflict issue was never revisited. The court decided that there had been
a number of delays and, regardless of disputes with counsel, there would not be
any further delays. ["

see the difficulty from the court's view is just that we

need to get this resolved one way or the other and go forward" (T,4/26/10,P6,L3)]
It appears that the trial court was more concerned with expedience rather than due
process. The court had its mind made up that "we've got to move forward today".
(T,4/26/10,P6,L22) It is noteworthy that the hearing was continued for additional
testimony to July 1, 2010, some months later. (T,4/26/10,P31,L6)
Plea Hearing of October 19, 2009
At the commencement of the hearing of April 26, 2010, counsel for
Defendant requested the Court to listen to the plea hearing that had occurred on
October 19, 2009. A copy of a CD from the Court's recording system was marked
and admitted as Exhibit 1. The Court requested a transcript of the October 19,
2009, hearing which was provided. Appearing for Defendant at the October 19,
2009, hearing was attorney Rhome D. Zabriskie. (T, 10/19/09,P3,L9)
Counsel for Defendant set forth the agreement as to the "case ending 141"
and stated "it's agreed by the parties that the defendant will enter a guilty plea to
count 1

the State would move to dismiss counts 2,3 and 4". (T,10/19/09,P3,L20)

As to the case "ending in 142, likewise the defendant would enter a guilty plea to
count l...the State would move to dismiss count 2". The agreement further

6
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specified that "there's a case where there is a pending investigation that the State
will not pursue those allegations further." (T,10/19/09,P4,L1)
The Court then asked a series of questions related to the agreement and
representation of counsel as follows: (T, 10/19/09,P4,L 15)
Court: Mr. Nielsen, have you had enough time to visit with your attorney
about this plea agreement?
Defendant: Yes, I have.
Court: Are you satisfied with the advice and help he had provided you?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Do you need any time to ask him any additional questions?
Defendant: No, Your Honor.
Court: Have you read that document that is there on the podium entitled
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Do you understand it?
Defendant? Yup.
Court: Do you have questions about any part of it?
Defendant: No, I don't, Your Honor.
The balance of the information which must be given to Defendant was
found in the Statement of Defendant Upon Plea of Guilty. There was no inquiry at
this point about the Defendant's mental state or capacity to understand even
though there was when the motion to withdraw pleas was filed.

7
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Motion to Withdraw Plead on November 24, 2009
Sentencing was scheduled for November 24, 2009. On that day, counsel for
Defendant appeared with him and handed the Court the motion to withdraw the
pleas which was filed the previous day. The court stated that it had already read
the pre-sentence report and was prepared to pronounce sentence.
(T,l l/24/09,P3,L8) The State objected to withdrawal of the pleas. (T,l 1/24/09,
P3,L17) Counsel for Defendant cited several district court decisions from around
the state to support his motion. (T,l l/24/09,P4,L7) The Court indicated that the
practice in Box Elder County was different depending on the position of the
prosecutor. (T,l 1/24/09, P4,L22) Counsel for Defendant admitted that the pleas
may not have been voluntary: (T,ll/24/09,P5,L10)
Mr. Zarbriskie: I don't think it is disputed between the parties that David is
not your typical defendant that comes before this court. He has a malady
that he struggled with for some time, that being his bipolar condition, which
our good doctor here has been working with David on for some time.
in my experience in representing defendants throughout the state, when I
am dealing with people who suffer from either a bipolar condition or a
similar psychological malady, they sometimes are maybe a little more
susceptible to the persuasion that we defense attorneys exercise upon them
in our efforts to get them to do what we think is the right thing in the case.
Mr. Zarbriskie went on to explain that Defendant's doctor "was completely
shocked that he had plead to these charges and had not gone to trial as he had
planned". (T,l l/24/09,P6,L4) The doctor explained that Defendant did not want
to plea to the charges and had only agreed "after strong urging by his attorney".
(T,l l/24/09,P6,L5) Mr. Zarbriskie admitted he would not make these arguments
with other clients, but that in the case of Defendant, he believed that he was "more
8
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susceptible to persuasion" than others. (T,l l/24/09,P6,L13)
The Court also pointed out that the Defendant probably did not understand
the implications of his pleas on his status as a parolee from Idaho transferred to
Utah under the Interstate Compact; his counsel admitted this was probably the
case as well. (T,l l/24/09,P7,L6) As a result of these pleas, Defendant has been
extradited to Idaho and is facing revocation of his parol there and imprisonment.
While agreeing that Defendant's concerns about his parol status were legitimate,
the court stated that it still viewed the situation as a legal rather than a factual
issue. (T,ll/24/09,P7,L14)
The trial court did not believe that much would be accomplished by an
evidentiary hearing, but set one (1) anyway at the request of the prosecutor.
(T,l l/24/09,P8,L21) The Court viewed the "big issue" as the impact of the plea on
the Idaho parol. (T,l 1/24/09, P9,L1) The State and counsel for Defendant then
agreed that counsel for Defendant would be withdrawn from the case.
(T,ll/24/09,P12,L9)
Hearing of April 26.2010
Defendant testified on April 26, 2010, that he entered the pleas on October
19, 2009. (T,4/26/10,P14,Ll 1) Prior to discussing what was said by his prior
attorney, Defendant waived the attorney client privilege. (T,4/26/10,P15,L3) He
never discussed the terms of the plea agreement with former counsel, but simply
signed the Statement of Defendant Upon Plea of Guilty because his attorney told
him to sign it. (T,4/26/10,P16,Ll)

9
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Defendant testified that he met with former counsel on the night prior to
entry of the plea for about two (2) hours. He was told at this meeting that he
needed to plea guilty. The terms of the plea offer were never discussed during this
meeting. (T,4/26/10,P156L12) Indeed, Defendant had never discussed the facts of
his case with his prior attorney and could not understand why his lawyer would
want him to plea. (T,4/26/10,P16,L19)
During the meeting on Sunday night, Defendant just listened, but did not
ask questions nor did he agree to plea. (T,4/26/10,P18,L7) When Defendant left
this Sunday evening meeting with his former lawyer, he had not decided anything
about the plea. (T,4/26/l0,P 18,L23) By the time Defendant arrived at court to
enter a plea, he still had not decided to plea. (T,4/26/10,P18,L2) Defendant
continued to be concerned that his former lawyer had never sat with him and heard
what the case was about factually. (T,4/26/10,P19,L9)
The next morning, Defendant arrived at court early with the expectation that
his former attorney would discuss the case more with him, however, when his
attorney arrived, he went into a conference room, but not with Defendant.
(T,4/26/10, P19,L21) Before Defendant could meet with his lawyer, the Court's
bailiff called the case. (T,4/26/10,P20,L2) It was not until he was presented with
the plea documents did he again have a brief conversation with his lawyer.
(T,4/26/10,P20,L9)
Defendant signed the plea documents because he "didn't want to hold up the
proceedings anymore

" (T,4/26/10,P21,Ll) Never did Defendant tell his
10
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former lawyer that he would agree to plea. (T,4/26/10,P22,L8) The Defendant
listened to the trial court's questions about entry of the plea as set forth on a Court
CD (Exhibit l2) and stated that he only said he was entering a plea voluntarily
because he did not want to be "confrontational" with the judge and that when he
tried to explain things to the judge, his lawyer jumped in and would not allow it.
(T,4/26/10,P23,L3-15)
On November 23 or 24, 2009, Defendant, while at court, had a discussion
with his former lawyer about the terms of the plea. (T,4/26/10,P23,L20) He did
not know until more than a month later some of the conditions. (T,4/26/10,P24,Ll)
Defendant testified that he has been diagnosed with atypical bipolarism.
(T,4/26/10,P24,L19) This mental illness affected Defendant when certain
"triggers" occurred and caused him to react in a patterned form; mostly these
triggers occur from stress, including the stress of court. (T,4/26/10,P24,L24) The
effect of these triggers on Defendant is that he does not sleep and comes to a point
where he will say anything a persons wants of him. (T,4/26/10,P25,L3) He
becomes compulsive over cleaning thing as well. (T,4/26/10,P25,L7)
Of importance to this case is that Defendant's mental health effects his
ability to make decisions. (T,4/26/10,P25,L15) At the time Defendant entered the
pleas on October 19, 2009, he was under treatment for his atypical bipolarism.
(T,4/26/10,P25,L25) The treatment commenced in March 2007, and consisted of
2

Prior to testimony, the parties went into the judge's chambers and listened
to the October 19, 2009, questioning by the Court at the plea hearing. The CD
was marked and admitted at Exhibit 1. (T,4/26/10,P9,L20 & P10,L6)
11
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meetings with a mental health professional once a week at which he discussed
decisions and life in general. (T,4/26/10,P26L14) Defendant had consistently told
his mental health professional that he was innocent of these charges and that he
always intended to proceed to trial to prove he was innocence. (T,4/26/10,
P27,L12) He had discussed this in his counseling session on the Thursday prior to
the plea and at that time he did not want to plea, but wanted to go to trial.
(T,4/26/10,P29,L5)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow
him to withdraw his pleas and to be represented by counsel of his choice at the
plea withdrawal hearing given his mental health problems. The mental health
implications are shown in the Pre-Sentence Report. Defendant will do whatever a
person in authority tells him must be done. (Confidential Envelope Containing
Pre-Sentence Report and Addendum - Al2)
There was a mental health evaluation performed on Defendant and in the
possession of the trial court at the time the motion to withdraw pleas was denied.
(Pre-Sentence Report) Defendant's pleas were not voluntarily made. Defendant's
position was that his mental illness overrode his free will, so that the plea
agreements were not voluntary. (T,4/26/10,P12,Ll)
ARGUMENTS
Our criminal justice system is not well equipped to handle people who are
mentally ill and who commit criminal acts. As noted by Defendant's attorney,

12
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there was "no dispute between the parties" that Defendant was not your typical
defendant. He had struggled for years with mental health issues. In looking at
whether the trial court abused its discretion, the Court should consider whether the
discretion properly took into account Defendant's mental health.
There is also no dispute that Defendant said the right words at his plea
hearing, signed the correct forms and responded to the Court's inquiries with the
proper answers. If Defendant were a "normal" or "average" defendant, the Court
would not need to read further in this brief to sustain the trial court. However,
Defendant was and is not a "normal" or "average" defendant. The Court
acknowledged this simple fact. The real question in this appeal is what impact, if
any, does the mental health of a defendant have on the plea process. No new law is
needed, however, rather all that is needed is a close implementation of existing
law. In State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403 (1986), the Utah Supreme Court explained
what needs to be present for a defendant's plea to be valid:
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea since he did not understand the nature
of the charges against him or the consequences of his plea
We have held that the absence of a finding under this section is not critical
so long as the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences
and of the rights he was waiving. Brooks v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 310
(1985); Warner v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 309 (1985).
The question is whether the " record as a whole affirmatively establishes
that the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its
consequences and of the rights he was waiving". Did Defendant's mental health
13
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play into the "whole" record here? The facts cannot be read with any degree of
reasonable understanding without leading to a conclusion that Defendant's mental
health was one (1) of the most, if not the most, important factor in determining if
the trial Court exercised its discretion properly and without abuse.
In a different context, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Barrett, 2006
Utah App. 417, 147 P.3d 491 (2006) discussed what should be taken into account
when determining if a confession is voluntary, not unlike determining if a
defendant understands what he is doing when he pleas:
we must therefore determine whether the statements Defendant made
prior to his Miranda warnings were "[]accompanied by any actual coercion
or other circumstances calculated to undermine [his] ability to exercise
his free will." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285. To determine
whether a suspectfs statements were coerced, courts look to the totality of
circumstances. Factors to consider in examining the totality of the
circumstances include not only the crucial element of police coercion, the
length of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, defendant's
maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health. (Emphasis
added.)
When looking at whether a criminal suspect or defendant is acting with free
will when actions are contrary to his rights, the Court must look at the mental
health as well as all other factors surrounding the plea. Here, the Defendant said
the correct words and signed the correct forms. At the original scheduled
sentencing on November 24, 2009, the Court had read the pre-sentence report,
including the report on Defendant's mental health. When considering the motion
to withdraw the plea, the Court should have considered Defendant's ability to fully
understand and act with his mental health limitations at the time of the plea.
While no court has ever held that a defendant's mental health care provider
14
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should be required to certify that a defendant is acting knowingly or voluntarily, in
this case, such testimony would have insured a free will plea. In a mandatory death
penalty appeal, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Aquelles . 2003 Utah 1, 63
P.3d 731 (Utah 2003), stated that pleading to a criminal charge involves the
principles of due process and requires the present mental ability to understand:
It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be mentally
competent to plead guilty and to stand trial. "A mentally incompetent
defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings against such a defendant
do not comport with due process." Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, 20 P.3d 382
(quoting State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989)
Section 77-15-1 of the Utah Code mandates that "[n]o person who is
incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-15-1 (2002). Section 77-15-2 defines a defendant's incompetency to
proceed as an "inability to have a rational and factual understanding of
the proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense
charged; o r . . . his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in
the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2(l)-(2) (2002).
We have held that "[i]n determining whether a defendant is competent to
plead guilty, the trial court must consider whether the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." State v. Holland, 921
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)).
"" [Competency is established when a defendant can, but not necessarily
will, assist or consult with counsel.'" State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 51, 20
P.3d 342 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 668 (Utah 1997))
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant submits that the record establishes that at the time he entered his
pleas, Defendant was not acting with free will. He gave in to the influences of his
lawyer. He wanted to go to trial and as soon as he was with someone he felt he
could speak his mind to, did so; i.e. when his mental health counselor returned,
15
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Defendant told him what had happened which "shocked" his counselor.
CONCLUSIONS/RELIEF REQUESTED
The trial court should have granted Defendants motion to withdraw his plea
under the facts of this case. Defendant suffered from mental impairment at the
time he entered his plea. The Court did not give Defendant a choice when it gave
him the option of moving forward with a lawyer whom he believed had a conflict
of interest or by requiring Defendant to represent himself. The Court knew of
Defendant's mental health problems when he gave Defendant this option.
The Court abused its discretion by ignoring Defendant's lengthy history of
mental problems and by requiring Defendant to proceed with a lawyer who had a
conflict of interest. This Court should grant the motion to set aside the pleas as an
abuse of discretion.
Dated this 18th day of January, 2011.

©ERT COLONS
C.
Appellate Attorney for Defendant
Utah State Bar Number 0554
3241 East Shea Blvd., Suite 1
Phoenix, Arizona, 85028
(602) 788-7227
Email: bobcollins@collinslaw.net
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage prepaid, on the 20th day of January, 2011, to the following:
Brandon Maynard
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney
9 West Forest Street, Suite 310
BrighanrCJty, Utah, 84302

C.^OBERT COLLINS

STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24 (a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Appellate
Procedure, an addendum to this brief follows. The addendum contains:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures.
Decision of the trial court denying Motion to Withdraw Plea.
Excerpts of transcripts on appeal.
Transcript of the court's oral decision.

Dated this 18th day of January,

C. ROBERT COLLINS
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs
DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN,
Defendant

CASE 091100141
and
091100142
Judge Ben H Hadfield

This matter is before the court pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea. The plea was entered on October 19, 2009, approximately 48 hours before the
scheduled jury trial was to begin.

Defendant entered guilty pleas to two class A

misdemeanor charges of Violation of a Stalking Injunction, and in exchange, four similar
charges were dismissed, and the State promised not to file an additional charge whfch was
under investigation. At the scheduled sentencing hearing on November 24, 2009,
Defendant moved to w thdrawthe guilty plea.- Defense counsel, Mr Zabriskie, afso moved
to withdraw as counsel and the matter was continued so that Defendant could secure other
legal counsel.
On Decern be 22, 2009, a status hearing was held, at which time Defendant
advised the court that: (attorney Danny Frazier was not available that day. A hearing was
next held on January I, 2010, attended by the defendant and his attorney, Mr Frazier. A
hearing on the motioni jto withdraw plea was set for March 1,2010. On February 26,2010,
Mr Frazier filed a Motiqn for Continuance. The matter was rescheduled to April 26, 2010,
at 2:30.
On April 22, 21010, Mr Frazier filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. A hearing
was held on April 29, 2010. The Motion to Withdraw as Counsel was considered. The
defendant was advisep that the hearing would proceed on that date and that he could
either proceed pro se if he agreed for Mr Frazier to be excused, or the hearing would
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proceed with Mr Frazier serving as Defendant's counsel. The defendant chose to proceed
with Mr Frazier's assistance. At the conclusion of the day on April 29, 2010, the hearing
was continued to July 1 ,|2010, at 9:00 a.m.
Sixty days later,(approximately 36 hours prior to the July 1 * hearing, the defendant
filed a pro se Motion to Continue, indicating that he wanted to hire another attorney and
have Mr Frazier excused. The court denied this motion on the basis that any new attorney
should have been procured in the previous months and, if he or she had been available
for the July 1 hearing, wouid have been allowed to proceed.
At the hearing i n July 1, the court heard from Dr Gary Sazma, Utahna Nielsen,
the defendant's mother, (and RhomeZabriskie, the defendantsformer counsel. Defendant
indicated he did not desi re to call any other witnesses. Defendant had personally testified
at the April 29, 2010 hearing. The court advised counsel that It would take this matter
under advisement and prepare a memorandum decision.
The court has reviewed the transcript of the change of plea on October 19,2009,
The court has also listened to those proceedings so that it could hear the voice intonations
and other subtleties wnich are often involved in communication. The Defendant did not
sound hesitant nor confused at the hearing. He answered questions directly. In reviewing
the summary of evidence as stated by the prosecutor. Defendant made a clarification
because he feii the version stated by the prosecutor was not entirely accurate.
The court has also reviewed the written Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea
and Certificate of Counsel as filed in each case. Defendant has not raised an issue
regarding these documents, and they appear to contain the required language and
signatures.
The crux of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw seems to be the allegation that the
defendant, because of nis bi-polar condition, is anxious to please, and is easily persuaded
to go along with what simeone says. The essence of the argument being that Mr Zabriskie
had overridden the defendant's will and coerced him into entering a guilty plea. The
defendant's testimony regarding a meeting with counsel the night before the plea, is quite
illuminating.
Q:

What happened-what else happened t h a t -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

p.o

1 13 10

02:ISp

Neldan

Nielsen

«*dO

t<L*-(Laf

They asWed me what I wanted to do, and I told them that I hadn't made a
decision ^nd that I would talk to them in the morning about i t . . .
Beginning at Ine 23:
Q: As of the time you left this meeting, you still had not decided to enter into a
plea agreement?
A: No. We were going to discuss it in the morning of court. Transcript p. 18
A:

This recollection by the Defendant does not evidence someone who is easily
overwhelmed or who i anxious to please and agrees with whatever an attorney might
suggest or recommend. On the contrary, it appears that after a meeting which the
defendant suggests laapted two hours, the defendant was stilJ unwilling to commit as to
which decision he wouid make. This testimony by the defendant seems to directly conflict
with Dr Gary Sazma's testimony suggesting the.defendant is anxious to please and would
go along with whatever an attorney suggested.
Dr Gary Sazmk the defendant's therapist, testified that the defendant was not in
a manic state on the date of the guilty plea nor in the weeks following. Dr Sazrna, under
cross examination, admitted that the defendant tied to him about his reasons for missing
two counseling sessions.
Additionally, in a handwritten statement created by the defendant five days after
the guitty plea, the defendant advised Adult Probation and Parole of the facts constituting
the offense. He wrote out his version of those facts, admitting the offense. Neither the
court nor the prosecutor nor defense counsel were present to override his free will.
The defendan *s mother, Utahna Nielsen, testified that because of Defendant's
condition, she was present with him at every court hearing and at every meeting held with
his attorneys. She told the court that she did not feel Defendant understood things at the
time of his guilty piea. However, she did not provide any testimony suggesting that she had
confronted defense counsel either prior to the guilty plea hearing or afterwards in an
attempt to "set the record straight". The first such claim occurred five weeks later, after the
presentence report haa been prepared and received.
Mr Rhome Zamriskie testified that before court on the morning of the guilty plea,
he spent "considerable time with Defendant that morning*. The hearing was scheduled for
9:00 a.m. but did not actually begin until 9:30. Mr Zabriskie further acknowledged that at
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the time the guilty plea|J was made, he, as counsel fcr the defendant believed that the
defendant was knowingijy and voluntarily entering the guilty pleas. He further testified that
during his representation of the defendant in preparation for trial, the defendant seemed
to have unreasonable expectations with regards to atrial outcome. The defendant seemed
not to recognize what his own attorney characterized as an "overwhelming amount of
evidence" against the defendant.
Entering a guilty plea to a criminal charge in a court of record is a stressful
occasion for nearly every individual who undergoes this experience;
Virtually m defendants have misgivings about pleading guilty.
Virtually all defendants are conflicted, in that they would prefer not to be
convicted
In this court's 18 years of experience, these things do not suggest that the
defendant is coerced ondoes not understand the ramifications of a guilty plea, Ratherthey
suggest a comprehenspn of all of the circumstances involved and the ramifications. '
Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that there has not been a showing of
good cause on the part of the defendant to set aside the guilty plea and the motion is
denied. Sentencing hearing is scheduled for July 20, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.

Dated this the

*?

day of July 2010.
_ _ ^ BY THE COURT
4&g$. OP tiif*^
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 091100141 by the method and on the date
specified.

Q

MAIL: DAVID SHUIjWAY NIELSEN C/O UTAKNA NIELSEN 2460 S 500 W PERRY,
UT 843 02
MAIL: C DANNY E FRAZIER JR PO BOX 16 6 DRAPER UT 84020
J^tf-MftXfc: S T E P H E N R HADFIELD 9 W FOREST STREET STE 310 BRIGKAM CITY

Date:

H l/3d ULQ-

rid fa
Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

!

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN
SUPPORT OF PLEA AND
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
V.

Case No: 091100141

DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN,
Defendant,

I, David Shumway Nielsen, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s):
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Count 1- Violation of Stalking Injunction (2032)

A

§76-5-106,5

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
0-360 days in jail
0-$2,500 fine plus
an 85% surcharge

T have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to
me, and 1 understand the nature and the elements of the crimes) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
Count 1:
-did knowingly and intentionally violate a stalking injunction.
1 understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above, or if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing crimes.
I stipulate and agree, or if! am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest that the following
facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable.
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty, or no contest plea(s) and prove the
elements of the crime(s) to which 1 ara pleading guilty or no contest:
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-On or about May 3, 2009, in Box Elder County, the defendant was discovered by
law enforcement to have made phone calls to Shere Holtz in violation of a stalking
injunction that was issued April 17,2009,
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
1 hereby certify that I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the
consequences of my guilty or not contest plea(s) with my attorney, Rhome D Zabriskie, and I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty or no
contest and the consequences of my plea(s).
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the Constitution of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty
or no contest I will give up all the following rights:
Jury Trial. I know that I have right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty or no contest.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial 1 would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and my
attorney would have the right opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified
against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those cost
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof* J know that if I do not plead guilty or
no contest, I am presumed innocent until the State proves that 1 am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, 1 need only plead "not guilty," and my case
will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the
charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous,
meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty or no contest, I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, 1
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an

<3>
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appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty or no contest.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above*
Consequences of Entering a Guilt}' or >o Contest Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime
to which I am pleading guilty or not contest. I know that by pleading guilty or no contest to a
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, 1 will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory
penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison/jail term, fine, or both.
Surcharge- 1 know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes,
including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea
agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be impose one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty or no contest, my guilty or
no contest plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. [f the offense
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole. I know the law
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
Plea bargain. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are
fiillv contained in this statement:
0

Mf

-The State will not prosecute on Count 2*bf the information.
Trial Judge not bound. I understand that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge
may do are not binding on the Judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty or no contest. No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.

/I r*
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I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but 1 do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
1 am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am jO years of age. I have attended school through the /x_ grade. I can read and
understand the English language. If 1 do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. 1 was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. 1 am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty or no contest plea(s), I must file a
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before I have been sentenced and final judgment
has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if! show good cause* I will
not be allowed to withdraw my plea after sentence has been announced..
Dated this

of &c>/*&*>r

,A^^?^j&t^

DEFENDANT
Certificate of Defense Attorney

T certify that I am the attorney for David Shumway Nielsen> the defendant above, and
that 1 know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her, I have discussed it
with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accuratg>arid true, y^

- ^^6—ATTORNEY -F§R DEFENDANT

Bar^o.?//j:

< v-<£)
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the above-captioned case. I have
reviewed this statement of defendant and find the factual basis of the defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats,
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully
contained in this Statement. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Bar No.
Order
Based en the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty or no contest plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty or no contest plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this /?day of_

oM
/A."
V

:"::,-,2009.

•:JUDQE
£}OJL
HADKELD

<••'".•
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RHOME D. ZABR1SKIE, #9113
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
3507 North University Ave., Ste. 150
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7680
Facsimile: (801) 375-7686
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEAS

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.: 091100141 &
091100142

DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN,
Defendant

COMES NOW the defendant by and through counsel, Rhome D. Zabriskie, pursuant to
UC A 77-13-6(2)(a), and motions the Court to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas in the
above-captioned cases. The defendant argues that when he entered his guilty pleas he did so
without having full knowledge of the potential consequences of doing so. One of those
consequences is the possibility that the two convictions will likely result in his Idaho probation
being violated. Prior to entering his plea in the above-captioned cases he relied upon a statement
of Sgt. Millaway mat convictions to three or more misdemeanors would result in his Idaho
probation being violated. David now has indication that he may be violated in Idaho for his two
misdemeanor guilty pleas. Furthermore, David has expressed to his psychologists Dr. Gary
Sazama that, "...he did not wan t to plead to the charges but agreed after strong urging by his
.

'
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attorney" (see Dr. Sazama report included with PS I).
Traditionally, Utah Courts have been liberal in evaluating whether there are appropriate
grounds for permitting a defendant to withdraw guilty pleas to misdemeanor charges. One
example is the Nephi District Court where Judge Eyre has an established policy of permitting
defendant's to withdraw guilty pleas in any misdemeanor cases without any inquiry as to "good
euase." In this case the defendant has shown good cause demonstrating that he did not realize a
collateral consequence (being violated in Idaho) of entering said pleas. He has also inferred that
he entered his guilty pleas, at least in part, as a result of pressure being placed upon him by his
attorney. Based upon the foregoing. David should be permitted to withdraw the guilty pleas he
has entered
in both
cases.
:erea m
ootn cases.
U
it
/ __
DATED this 21 ~dav of j V d ? w W ± ^ l .

.2009.......
^ - -

>

-*:-;

>Z
RHOME D. ZABRISKIE

J .
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NovemW1<S,2009
fkst Judrcki District Court
Judge Ben Ha&fieid
43 North Mafci
Bright City, Utah §4302
RE:

©a^^Niefeea

¥o«r Honor*
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ha has required basphalization cm
tbtee#ccasion& 3&uidisii0tptese^
Heig/and appears completely lionfcal,
wflfchav^exh^^
Thegoatesfo m . t ^ ^
Ih^tapy^si'eqiiiredby the cdurts,
esi^lisfcavi^iemet^
<^o^e>an& j ^ ^
\ritS5in tecoxriififfibtibil levelsatid
toest&liafoavia©^^
and earfy intervention.
Davidv^icceasfyily cottiglded d l a ^
He bad
<son§ttf#tedawery effective relapseprev^ttoti pltoaiid was completely compliant taking
-mcdleaiiQaand monitoring blood levels. H^estabiished^
IwdliettaidWEKMq^pa^
tliiferftinatcly^evea with bU best efforts, David
^porieaoedtwoaea^naliyT^^
both raqufting hospitalisation. At the onset
of each ofdiese episodes Itevidbacam^^
spent exorbitant
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amountsofmonsy :aadbecaaaeh35>er.3exu£iteA. AslsissStepdepr&atiori-ocudHnied,he
required hospitalization and developed a step 4eprivatioa psychosis.
FoUowi^ikese e p i ^
to tnatoefiaacetherapy to
control and Hmitmaiiic episodes. ^'iDa^di^uiic&iQfn medication, regularbldod levtil cheeks and
ntttfflsQf^

effect Oa^d was meficuloiis mamfflng:Msme^ca^^ diet* andexerdse and blood level
testing. Withtl3&^
maintenance visits,
la eariy wnter of2 0 0 ^
IbBsiness. Headiftittedthat
he &k sorryforJieJ^ecaa^
were hornless and Hvfng out of
their ear. Ifcadmxtt^ ^
and took
tfce«fle as ^c^fetker". ^fffe^om^
I
ftacsms^eein^s^^
Hater learned thai
David hMbecome^fo^^
Me m ^ e heripart of
Ms^mpan^
father. T taterlean^
pressure ^ml^r^ntft to i3ome,:u^
fee
discovered during ther^y,
ixk &pM p£WQ93S)&ni& ^tts4 ^-^S^P^bS^
Bijrthe time T saw him,
te
faM<Slig^^
Af&fe^Mt met
ttewi^jgitf^^
It was v^^-iiairipdiately -apparent ^ /
lomafli^fieh^^a«}e&- vetjri^etffi^
awomas wh^exftiKtted^tong / V
Boti^lme^Pfefsonaiiiy} EMsaiy^
Mghitehed-ielapfiB
'
:prevet$dns^laB$^
€ < ^ e t s between these^^
sottie^atmariies^^
©MddoesiioiiitoftaMsto^of
dottie^c-viqlcn^
de£eno4atfi&:tod^
At this^point,fi>a*ddorclered-herto
loaveiasfii8tef'shonibj ^^ch:fl^^uMitdj^o^ S^.ltisadng convicts giiicfcjy escalated I am
flotsoiwn^ijfe
W£\e\a}mi&&
WtmQffetxveandmfta
FdHcrvyltigiBavid's
BE&st fbrike second &ue due to aMeg^on&that&e&ad violated a.ponc>t$ctive order atteinpfiQg to
eoatacther* he-adcaitfed hebecamo despondent* hopelessaboutbeing^^ incai^emted agal^ and
attempted stdcfdo,
Fdllowiftgifour months of incameratio^ Bavidretumed to treatment on a regular basis while
awaitiiig Mai on these charges* *£wo ^weeksa^Aviien -fcretamedfrom vacation* I was
ecmjpletejy sho<&edt^tlie ^
^ he bad
pfamaed jfe explained he d?d a o t ; ^ ^
agreed after strong urging by
fas attorney.
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Up to tJie^me that David met m&became mvdivad -vdth tliJs.V^Ottto^lie had tiat had any
pttfclatris what 46 ever. He had been completely eompUant WiQx therapy, Itte4icatt66s tod bafi
appropriately 6sitsA sevetal diffstenl women. 1 believe DaVid made poor choices getting
involvfaiwiaxan unheaKHy woman snd should haverespondedto she boundaries that he saw
being crossed aa they became mote evolved* He has been able to isolate his desire to have
dompanionahip as the detenninlng&otot that HiSk his naivety and poor judgment
1 hope your honor will look at thtrivhole picture of how this case came together. T believe this is
afca&s6f a poor relaifa&ship choice and Wo people each with Hh&ir owi mental health difficulties
which fueled and ugly split -up, not domestic violence or stalking.
1 appreciate your consideration.
Respectfully^

•/Ujf *£~~,rt-Q
Gary FStoaha, PbJDt
UcehsedCtiBkalPsychoio^ -

A-rt
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Online Court Assistant Program

(f[O\0O^O%

Case Number:
Court: First District Court
CoUnty; Box Elder State: Utah

Request for Civil
Stalking Injunction
1

Petitioner (person needing protection):

ShtrtSusanntBoltz
Mil
mmo
u*i
Addrc$$ aad phone # (to keep private, leave btatik);
436W.223SS.
Perry, Vtah 84302
435-23P-m&
$5$~733-24Q9(Work)
Namaand phone ntombej; of Petidoner^tbrney (If My):

2

'Respondent (personyouneecHobo protected-from):

\ BaiMSkmMyWtefan

J

' ftet

MWto
Oiherflainefr vst&Drm
Address;
24MS.50Qw.

Lssl
'

fm%ut<jkmm
A3Bd#can grant* stalking .injunction only If the Respondent did these S things:
(1)' The Respondent tufted you specifically, rwoor jnoTetfme$/ u Sr^e^^
vfcUiHy close to. you, made Verbal or written threat to you; or did something ih*i was threatening,
(2) TheRespondent toew or should have Icnownthawhe^taibng would cai^eyoa to fear thatyou or a family member
could bo physically httftor emotionally distressed, or rhat-a jre^sonabtepcfson would be arraid of being physically
hurt or emotionally distressed, and
(3) The Respondent staling actually made you nr an immediate1 fa daily member- emotionally disOreiaed or fearful that
yeo would be hart. An "immediate family member** means your spouse, thild> sibling, or any other person who
. live* with you now, or who lived with you within thepast £ tadntb$.
Notol to addition to your own statements in MiXcqwsi, you mnarptovidtsome other evidence of stalking, like police
report sworn $tatoments from wimesseSv andiotapeSjphtoiiUter^etc,
For a complete definition of stalking, see Utah Code §§.7$&lW.$and 77-3a-

mm
-3

Provide as much information a s you can about the ftespondem. (/ you don't know, write ^unknown: *
Respondent's Employer (Name and address):
Traffic $emc*s Inc. 2460 S, 500 M Perry, Utah

*f$*rtfer Ota Stdihing Ir^mctfon

-

\&t.

A"**-

ApprovalBoard of Qta/tct Court JtitgKjvne&OS
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Online Com Attiiianct Program

Best place and time to find theR&pon6m: Plaa: Logan Regional Bosptial

Time: anytime

Other addrWes (hangout*): at home
Describe Respondent's vehicle; Make: Pord Model; pickup
Ye&r.unhio Colon green/white

License Plate; unknown

If more than one vehicle, describe here: Make: Pontine Mode): Bonneville
Ym; unknown Color: «&#• License ?lzxt: unknown
Ha* the Respondent used weapons or been violent in the past? Q Yas © No Q Don't know
Is the Respondent a law enforcement officer, government investigator
or licensed private investigator?
Q Yes 5) No 0 Don't know
4

Describe the stalking below;
a. When.and where did the stalking events happen? (Attach additional pages if necessary,)
1* stalking evenr.
When: M13M009
Where:
at my home
2*mllcin£eveffl:
When:
. .

M14I2M9
Where;

Sms^Bwy.mwmard.Viak
b, Who did yon report the-staBdag to (if anyone).?
Peny Police, Utah Highway
a

Patrol

list names of a3l people who witnessed the stalking:

CkandlerHottz
d List any evidence you have of the stalking, like Iranscripts, audiotape, police report?, photos, sworn statement*
from witnesses (affidavits), etc. You rraist attach ai least oneof these to this form,
sworn witness statement, police

reports

t. Describe what the stalker did ™d why h made you or your family member fed emotionally distressed or afraid of
being physically harmed, and why it would have made a reasonable person feel emotionally distressed or afraid of
being physically harmed:
RgQtffiStfofCMSiaikfftgli^ndfon

|

Apprtivad&y Board JQI Qlstiict Court Mprs,

M

A.J

June 20QC
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Onlfat Court A&isanefc Program

:..J

t
On Monday night? April 13,2009, David was in my home. My son sentnk a text saying that he w&s at
my house and thai he was manic* Band was digging through my personal belongings saying that
he needed stuff to sell. My son, Chandler,, tried io lock up as much as possible. When I arrived
home, my son unlocked my bedroom door and forked me inside saying that he would try to get
David to leave. David was refusing To leave stating ifat he was going tp move in with us. 1 went
and knocked on his door and told Dayid thai he needed to lean. Be flung the door open and
'swung- his arm around my neck, yankedme into the bedroom, and had my arm pimud behind my
back to try to take my cellphone. I called out to my son to call the police. My son came running
into the warn and tried to get the phone frdm DAve, Hyson punchedlpAve in the ch&si once and
was able to get my phone to cdlthe police. While my son was on the phone in the living room, I
triedto get £>Ave out of'the house. Me was yelling and screening. He grabbed me againandmy
son puncedhimin t)*e head Bo released me and took off Into the stveeh The police came and he
was found and arrested On Tuesday, AprUJ4; 2U9, he was releasedfqom the hospital when he
had been taken by police,the night before because he told them that he had taken a bunch ofpUls.
I received aphone callfrom an unknown number. It was him. Be wantedme to come and get him
because he was without a wallet or Wttnd^wh Wandering in downtown -Brigham in& T-shirt,
shorts, and slippers, He said ihat he'COuldn'tgeiahoM ofhisyarents. I.picked him up to iake'him
toWUtardtog&UisvehteUatone^
The whole way there; he was yelling at me and
accusing me ofthings. ^enwegotiohktrMtki[hande&
togetaut
He gmbbedmyartn midgrabbed my wdtUiandceUpnone.l tried to get my stuffand dragged me
outtflhedrivefs seatout ofthepassenger'door/My hand got citt and! wasbteedingl was still
tryvtgiogetmywattet. J tried to wme someone down,ftwasan off-duty WMIardpaUce officer.
The officer came andputDAve in the front ofhit truck andMen came to check on me because 1
was bleeding, As he .got to my door, X>a»ehadgdt out cfihetruck andwasrunningto his truck.
7%eoJffcer called disjtat&
again,. Be was then arrested Be was releasedfivrnjaSto Bear River Mental Health and.
immediately called mt on WEdnesday^ April 1$ 200$.
\

t Ota facts:
There have been other times whehhe has been violent with me. At the first of March 2Q09, he had
gone about 17 days with nosUep^llisparentsh^askedmetohelpta
of him. The first
night that! was with him, he?was swearing at me,$idled a knife and ran it across my chest and
stopped at my throat He stcaed that he shotMntdo it because IcouM get hx^ The nexidayi at work,
he picked up a big icy snowball and hit me in the face with U. Re pushed me thatday.The other thing
that scares me about him, is thathe says thathtdreams"aboutseeingmeandmy children dead After
his releasefromihehospttal, he would show up atmysohoolandkave notes on my car. He would
take pictures of me through the crack of the door whUe^l wos in class,
P

Checkhert ifyou naedmore spac&+ Ask the cktkfor iht "Describe Sielklns "form. Fillii our cmd atiech it to this/emi

fteQUCJtfof Civil Steflfos

tojanelkrt

3 ol&

Approved by 8oa#<rfDtetrfcl Court Judgas, June 2006

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/I »

Oftlme Court Attistttctfrogrm

Tha Petitioner must read and sign below:
I swear than
• I am ihcPetitioner and I have read this petition,
•• I am a victim of staBcin^ and believe the Respondeat is the stalfcer, and
• I Jive in this county or the Respondent Jives in this coiyiiSbr the stalking took pi
Date:

Petitioner's signatured

A ' j ^ ^

J

If the Petitioner is a mioor, then parent or guardian must sign below.
I swear that;
• I am Petitionees parent or guardian and J have read this petition,
• Petitioneris a victim of stalking and J believe the Respondent fe the striker, and
• The petitioner Eves in this county or the Respondent fives in ihfs cotinfy4 or the stalking rook place 14 this
<w*nty.
Date:

,.,_M Parent or iuardian^ ij^naturerk
Print Parent or guardian's name:

Clerk or Notary Public Wis out berfow;

» bxtidtf-

Subscribed and

.County, Utah

CkrkorNm

Request for Civil StiIWng lAjurtefan

SeU

Approved by ao$m xrt Q&rttf Court Judges. Jona floes

A*
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Stephen R. Hadfield, 5707
Box Elder County Attorney
Brandon J, Maynard, 8561
9 W. Forest St., Ste. 310
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: (435) 734-3329
Fax:
(435) 723-0785

K-»

______„._____

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER ON
SENTENCING

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Court Case #: 091100141

DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN,

Judge: Ben H. Hadfield

Defendant

THE ABOVE ENTITLED matter came on regularly for sentencing on 08/03/2010,
before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield. The Defendant appeared personally together
with his counsel of record, L. Todd Sessions. The State was represented by Brandon
J. Maynard of the Box Elder County Attorney's Office.
No legal or other reason having been shown why judgment should not be
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant is hereby convicted of
the following crime(s):
1: VIOLATION OF STALKING INJUNCTION, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5106.5,
a class A misdemeanor.
based upon his guilty plea.
Based upon said Judgment of Conviction, it is the Judgment and Order of the
Court that the Defendant is hereby sentenced to a term of 365 days in the Box Eider

A

f9
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435 723-2786
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p.2

County Jail. The total time suspended for this charge is 255 days. Credit is granted for
110 days previously served. Sentence to be served concurrent witn the sentence in
case #091100142.
Defendant to pay a fine of $950, plus interest,
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole with the following
conditions:
1. Violate no state, city, or federal law except minor traffic.
2. Successfully complete a mental health evaluation and counseling as
recommended.
3„ Serve 110 days jail with credit for 110 days served.
4. Pay a fine and surcharge of $925 plus S25 Court Security fee.
5. Have no contact with the victim, Shere Holtz.

The Court retains jurisdiction for further action in this matter.
•; •

•'. -... .
\-\ v

DATED this

I®

day of

A**«

2010.

r3~fl.

Ben H. Hadfield, Judge
First Judicial District Co
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby ce,1ify that on the
day of LLou2p_^_2G1C, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, postage pre-paia to;^
L. Todd Sessions
80 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah

CNV^Ktl

Legal Secretary

A -
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Stephen R. Hadfteld, 5107
Box Elder County Attorney
Brandon J. Maynard, 8561
9W. Forest St, Ste. 31 p
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: (435) 734-3B29
Fax:
(435) 723-0785

Ayftf$<H, /Of'*.
tewsdfrom ?-*-*?
*>
tf-gvy^r. A tate> rf J£±Jam
BOX ELDER COUNT*

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CffiJ-/0?Z6
tSS>

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER ON S

STATE OF UTAH,

SENTENCING

Plaintiff,

x

2

C3

Court Case #: 091100142

vs.
DAVID SHUMWAY NIELSEN

o?

Judge: Ben H, Hadfield

Defendant

THE ABOVE ENTITLED matter came on regularly for sentencing on 08/03/2010,
before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield. The Defendant appeared personally together
with his counsel of record, L Todd Sessions. The State was represented t y BrandoriN
J. Maynard of the Box Eider County Attorney's Office.
No legal or other reason having been-shown why judgment should not be
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant }s hereby convicted of
the following crime(s):
1: VIOLATION OF SJALK1NG INJUNCTION, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-

106.5,
' • • a class A misdemeanor
based upon his guilty piea
Based upon said Judgment of Conviction,ftis the Judgment and Order of the

:

(ttf
A. 1 1
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Court that the Defendant is hereby sentenced to a term of one (1) year. The total time
suspended for this charge is one (1) year. Sentence to be served concuTent with the
sentence on #0911001
Probation is to b^ supervised by Adult Probation & Paroie with the following
conditions:
1. Violate no state, pity, or federal law except minor traffic.
2. Probation concurrent with case #091100141.
3. All terms and conditions as ordered in case #091100141,

The Court retains1 jurisdiction for further action in this matter.
PATTED this
^

•

:

•

•

'

//?

day of

/fuj,

2010.

' • - • • •

.4V i I

&J.:k.
y -

T

;>

: • . ' • • •

%*.

^•fjeniri Hadfield, Judge
p r e j u d i c i a l District Cou
A\>

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
hereby certify that on trie J^^
day of QtiAfy^
copy of the foregoing document, postage pre-paid t

2010; I mailed a trsje and correct

L. Todd Sessions
80 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Legal Secretary

JAM
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Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury,
the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if
so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw
the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant

/J.P3
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has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been
read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 7713-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall
advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the
defendant to possess, receive or transport anyfirearmor ammunition. The failure to
advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other
charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(i)(l)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being
made by the prosecuting attorney.
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to
either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to

Aid
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determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a103.
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole.
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
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